Abstract. VSS (verifiable secret sharing) is an important security protection tool in distributed systems. When VSS is employed in publicly verifiable applications, it needs to achieve public verifiability and be upgraded to PVSS (publicly verifiable secret sharing). Besides the two basic security properties, bindingness and hidingness, PVSS concentrates on public verifiability of validity all the operations in VSS so that there is no doubt about any operation and any dispute can be publicly solved. The existing PVSS schemes achieve security and public verifiability at a high cost. Moreover, their public verification operations are not defined and specified comprehensively and in complete details. In addition, most of them are vulnerable to an attack called simple plaintext attack. To overcome those drawbacks in PVSS, a new PVSS protocol is proposed in this paper. It defines public verifiability of VSS in a comprehensive and formal security model, which describes every verification operation in details and can publicly solve any dispute. All the public verification operations are efficiently implemented in the new PVSS protocol, which is more efficient than the existing PVSS schemes. It prevents simple plaintext attack in an efficient way.
Introduction
The first threshold secret sharing technique is Shamir's t-out-of-n secret sharing [14] . It is one of the most basic tools in distributed computing systems. A dealer holds a secret and shares it among n distributed share holders. Any t distributed share holders can put their shares together to reconstruct the secret, while no information about the secret is obtained if the number of available distributed shares is less than t. In practical applications, sometimes the share holders do not trust the dealer and want to verify that their shares are valid such that any t of them reconstruct the same secret. So VSS [4, 12, 8, 6, 12, 3, 1, 5, [9] [10] [11] is proposed, in which there is a verification mechanism for each share holder to verify validity of his share. In VSS, the share verification mechanism cannot reveal any information about the secret or any of its shares. In [13] , this property is called hidingness, while in other schemes it has other names like zero knowledge, indistinguishability, confidentiality and privacy. We inherit the name hidingness and define it in a simulation-based formal model, which is popular in formal analysis of privacy. Another important security property in VSS is bindingness, which is called soundness or consistency in some other places. A VSS protocol is binding if its verification mechanism guarantees that each share is generated from the same secret.
In some applications of VSS, validity of sharing and reconstruction of the secret need to be publicly verified or checked. So PVSS is designed. The existing PVSS schemes [15, 2, 7, 13, 11] have some drawbacks. Firstly, they are complex and inefficient, especially in computation. Moreover, public verification operations are not comprehensively defined and specified in them. Most of them only focus on proof of validity of encryption in terms of the shares, while other public verification operations like public dispute solution and public verification of reconstruction are not specified in details. In addition, most of them [15, 2, 13] 1 publish a deterministic commitment of the secret and so are vulnerable to an attack called simple plaintext attack detailed in Section 2. The attack prevents application of the PVSS schemes in some environments. Although the attack can be prevented by replacing their commitment algorithms with probabilistic commitment algorithms, the countermeasure leads to more complex commitment, proof and verification operations, so further deteriorates efficiency of the PVSS schemes.
In this paper, a new PVSS protocol is designed. It achieves comprehensive public verifiability defined in complete details and in a formal security model. It is much more efficient than the existing PVSS schemes in both computation and communication. It is inherently invulnerable to the simple plaintext attack and does not need any additional cost to prevent it. The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. PVSS and its security properties, especially public verifiability, are formally and comprehensively defined and modeled in Section 2. The new PVSS protocol is proposed in Section 3. It is analysed in security and efficiency and compared with the existing PVSS schemes in Section 4. The paper is concluded in Section 5.
Security Model
In Shamir's t-out-of-n secret sharing [14] , a dealer A uses the following procedure to share a secret s among n distributed share holders P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n .
j where a 0 = s and a i for j = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1 are random integers. 2. A sends s i = f (i) as a share to P i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. 3. Any t share holders can reconstruct the secret: s = i∈V s i w i where w i = j∈V,j =i j j−i and V is the set containing the indexes of the t shares. Any group of less than t share holders get no information about the secret.
If the dealer is not trusted and the share holders want to verify validity of the shares, VSS is needed, which must satisfy the following two properties.
-Bindingness: there is a unique secret such that if the i th share passes the validity verification, it is the i th share of the unique secret. -Hidingness: the verification mechanism does not reveal any information about the secret.
VSS and its security properties are formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 (VSS) In a t-out-of-n VSS protocol, there exist explicitly or implicitly committed (to be detailed in Definition 2) integers a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t−1 such that any share holder P i can verify
Definition 2 An integer is explicitly committed to if its commitment is published. An integer is implicitly committed to if its unique existence can be proved such that successful verification of the proof with an overwhelmingly large probability guarantees that it is uniquely determined by the proof.
Definition 3 (Bindingness) In a t-out-of-n binding VSS protocol, if P i 's verification of validity of s i is passed with a non-negligible probability, it is guaranteed that s i = t−1 j=0 a j i j where integers a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t−1 are publicly committed to or extracted from the dealer's proof as defined in Definition 2.
Definition 4 (Hidingness) A VSS protocol is hiding if the information revealed in its verification mechanism can be simulated without any difference by a party without any knowledge of the secret or any of its share.
In applications of secret sharing requiring public verifiability, apart from the normal functionality of VSS, the following publicly verifiable operations are needed to publicly detect and handle various misbehaviors.
-Share distribution must be public. Namely, the dealer must publicly show that it really send a secret share to every share holder. -Validity of shares should be publicly verified against a public commitment of the secret. If the public verification is passed, any share holder's knowledge of a valid share can be publicly recognised and he cannot complain of receiving an invalid share later. -When the public verification of a share fails, there must be a public mechanism to detect whether the corresponding share holder or the dealer is cheating. -When the secret is reconstructed, it can be publicly verified to be correct against the public commitment of the secret. -When secret reconstruction fails, it can be publicly detected which share holder provides an invalid share and should be responsible.
These five operations are called public share distribution, public verification of share validity against public commitment, public solution to dispute in sharing, public verification of reconstruction and public detection of invalid share. More formally, in applications requiring public verifiability, PVSS is needed and Definitions 1, 3 and 4 should be extended to Definitions 5, 6 and 7 respectively.
Definition 5
In a t-out-of-n PVSS protocol, encryptions of the shares are published. Moreover, there is a public commitment of the secret denoted as C. The following public proofs and verifications are necessary.
-(Public verification of share validity against public commitment) Any share s i can be publicly verified through a proof and verification operation
where P (θ) −→ γ means that a party P with secret input θ outputs public information γ and ". . ." means that additional secret information may be used. The verification returns a public result
There exist explicitly or implicitly committed (as defined in Definition 2) integers a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t−1 such that if the verification result is T RU E for any s i it is guaranteed s i = t−1 j=0 a j i j where a 0 is the secret committed in C. -(Public solution to dispute in sharing) When (1) returns F ALSE, P i has to publicly prove his honesty through a proof
where sk i denotes P i 's private key, E i denotes the public encryption of P i 's share and P roof (τ ) (δ) denote a proof using secret information τ against public information δ. If the proof is successful, the dealer is cheating; otherwise P i is cheating. -(Public verification of reconstruction) The reconstructed secret ς, which includes s and perhaps other reconstruction results, can be publicly verified against C in
If the test is successful, s is publicly accepted as the secret committed in C. Otherwise, ς is invalid and some share used to reconstruct s must be invalid. -(Public detection of invalid share) When (2) fails, each share holder P i having participated in the reconstruction proves validity of the share he provides through a proof
If the proof is successful, P i is honest; otherwise P i is cheating.
Definition 6 (Bindingness in PVSS) If (1) returns T RU E with a non-negligible probability, it is publicly guaranteed that s i = t−1 j=0 a j i j where integers a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t−1 are publicly committed to or extracted from the dealer's proof as defined in Definition 2.
Definition 7 (Hidingness in PVSS) Before any share is published, the published information can be simulated in a indistinguishable way by a party without any knowledge of the secret or any of its share. In PVSS, commitment of the secret is usually published. So a special attack against privacy defined in Definition 8 cannot be ignored.
Definition 8 (Simple plaintext attack) Given a message s and C, the public commitment of the shared secret, a polynomial attacker wants to test whether s is committed in C and thus is the shared secret. The game can be more formally described as follows.
1.
If the probability that the polynomial attacker can correctly guess b is nonnegligible, the simple plaintext attack is successful.
In most applications of PVSS (e.g. e-voting) the message space contains some readable plaintexts with sensible meaning in a not-very-large range. So the simple plaintext attack is harmful. For example, by repeating it in a brute-force attack, an attacker can find the secret. When the attacker has some additional information about the secret, the attack is especially effective. So the PVSS schemes vulnerable to this attack [15, 2, 13] have limited applications.
Besides higher formality and comprehensiveness and awareness of simple plaintext attack, our definition has a novelty: the integers used to generate the shares (denoted as a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t−1 in our definition ) are not necessary to be explicitly committed to. As will be illustrated in Section 3, our design of PVSS takes advantage of this novel property to improve efficiency. As unlike in the existing PVSS schemes it is not necessary to make explicit commitment to a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t−1 and publish their commitments, efficiency in computation, communication and storage can be greatly improved. In our design, the dealer proves his knowledge of the integers used to generate the shares such that when his proof can succeed with a non-negligible probability a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t−1 can be uniquely extracted from his proof. As shown in Section 3.1, this novel mechanism in general works well in VSS, which only enables the share holders to verify their own shares and usually does not have a compulsory need to publish an explicit commitment of the secret. As sometimes in applications of PVSS an explicit public commitment of the secret is needed (especially when an application employs the PVSS mechanism and then securely handles the shared secret in a publicly verifiable manner), an explicit commitment of the secret (denoted as C) is still included in Definition 5. However, in comparison with the public and explicit commitment to t or 2t integers in the existing PVSS schemes, our design only explicitly commits to two integers and is much more efficient.
The New PVSS Protocol
The new PVSS protocol is proposed in this section. Firstly, its main idea is introduced. Then a detailed description is present.
The Main Idea
The main idea of the new PVSS technique is to specify VSS efficiently and then make all the operations publicly verifiable. VSS is designed in a novel way. After a secret is shared among some share holders, the dealer shares an additional random secret among them if they require verification of their shares. Then shares of the two secrets are combined by a random linear relation. Validity of the combined shares can be verified through Lagrange Interpolation. Verification of validity of the original shares is passed if and only if the combined shares are valid. The sharing and verification operations are as follows.
Setting:
A large prime q is chosen. It must be at least larger than any possible secret to share.
Sharing:
A builds a polynomial F (x) = t−1 j=0 a j x j where a 0 = s and a j for j = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1 are random integers chosen from Z q . A sends s i = F (i) mod q as a share to P i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. in Z q as a public challenge to A. (e) A publishes c j = b j + ra j mod q for j = 0, 1, . . . , t − 1. (f) Any P i can verify
if he doubts validity of his share. He accepts validity of s i if and only if the equation holds.
Reconstruction
A set with at least t share holders can reconstruct the secret: s = i∈V s i w i mod q where w i = j∈V,j =i j j−i mod q and V is the set containing the indexes of the t shares.
To achieve public verifiability, commitment of the secret and encryption of the shares should be published, so that the four proof and verification operations defined in Definition 5 can be publicly implemented against them. Especially, a much simpler and more efficient commitment mechanism is employed in our new design than in the existing PVSS schemes. The advantages of the new idea is that it can achieve high efficiency in both computation and communication.
Detailed Description
The basic operations of the new PVSS protocol are described in Figure 1 , while its proof and verification operations to support public verification as required in Definition 5 are described in Figure 2 . Note that in comparison with the existing PVSS schemes we employ much more efficient symmetric cipher to encrypt the shares when distributing them and much more efficient commitment operations when committing to the secret.
Public commitment
The dealer publicly publishes a commitment of his secret.
(a) p and q are large primes such that p = 2q + 1. G is the cyclic subgroup of Z * p with order q. g and h are two generators of G such that log g h is secret. (b) A has a secret s in Zq to share. He randomly chooses an additional secret k in Zq. (c) A publishes u = g s h x mod p and v = g k h y mod p where x and y are randomly chosen from Zq.
Public share distribution
The dealer encrypts the shares and publicly sends them to the share holders. Unlike the existing PVSS schemes, which employ costly asymmetric encryption algorithms, our new solution can employ a much more efficient symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the shares. However, for fairness in comparison with the existing PVSS schemes, we include distribution of the symmetric keys through asymmetric cipher in our share distribution procedure. The dealer publicly distributes the shares of secret s as follows. ajx j where a0 = s and aj for j = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1 are random integers chosen from Zq. (d) A calculates si = F (i) mod q and publishes ei = E k i (si) for each Pi where E k i () denotes symmetric encryption using session key ki and an symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g. AES).
Reconstruction
If at least t share holders submit their shares si, the secret s is reconstructed: s = i∈V siwi mod q where wi = j∈V,j =i j j−i mod q and V is the set containing the indexes of the t shares.
Fig. 1. Basic Operations of PVSS
-Public verification of share validity against public commitment 1. r = H(d1, d2, . . . , dn, e1, e2, . . . , en) is generated where H() is a one-way and collision-resistent hash function with an image domain Zq. 2. An Pi requesting public verification of his share decrypts di and obtains ki, which is then used to decrypt ei into si. 3. Pi publishes hi = H(ki + rsi). 4. A publishes cj = bj + raj mod q for j = 0, 1, . . . , t − 1 z = y + rx mod q. 5. Pi publishes zi = ki + rsi mod q. 6. It is publicly verified
Validity of si is accepted if and only if all the three equations (4) , (5) and (6) 
If they are satisfied, Pi is honest and the dealer must have given him an invalid share. Otherwise Pi is dishonest and must have tampered with his share. -Public verification of reconstruction 1. k is reconstructed: k = i∈V kiwi mod q where wi = j∈V,j =i
s passes the verification for its validity only if (7) is satisfied. Note that if necessary a new r in Zq can be randomly chosen (or generated by a hash function) and a new z can be calculated as z = y + rx mod q. -Public detection of invalid share
If (7) is not satisfied, the reconstructed s is invalid and some invalid share must have been used in the reconstruction. So for each si used in the reconstruction
are publicly verified. If any of the three equation fails for an si, the corresponding Pi must have given an invalid share and should be responsible for failure of the reconstruction.
Fig. 2. Proof and Verification Operations in PVSS

Analysis and Comparison
The four proof and verification operations in Figure 2 satisfy the security requirements in Definition 5, Definition 6 and Definition 7. Firstly, Theorem 1 illustrates that the "public verification of share validity against public commitment" operation implements public verification of validity of the shares. Secondly, it is straightforward that the "public solution to dispute in sharing" operation can publicly solve any dispute between the dealer and any share holder about validity of any share. Thirdly, Theorem 2 illustrates that the "public verification of reconstruction" operation publicly guarantees that the reconstructed secret s is committed in u. Fourthly, it is straightforward that the "public detection of invalid share" operation can publicly detect any invalid share provided by any share holder. So the new PVSS protocol is binding and improves public verifiability. Hidingness of the new PVSS protocol is proved in Theorem 3, which guarantees that the secret and its shares are not revealed and especially formally guarantees that the new PVSS protocol is invulnerable to the simple plaintext attack.
Theorem 1.
The new PVSS protocol can publicly guarantee validity of the shares against a public commitment of the secret. More precisely, if (4), (5) and (6) are satisfied with a probability larger than 1/q, s i is publicly guaranteed to be the i th share of the secret explicitly committed in u and generated by a polynomial determined by a set of implicitly committed integers a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t−1 as defined in Definition 5 and Definition 6.
